What it is like to be an Intelligence analyst

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To gain a better understanding of what it is like to be an intelligence analyst, read THIS ARTICLE. What resonated with you? What are 2-3 key lessons learned from it? https://warontherocks.com/2019/02/policy-and-you-a-guide-for-intelligence-analysts/

After viewing this video, what resonates with you? What are 1-2 key items we can learn from this presentation?

  • https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HcMZ5er_PqY

Provide appropriate responses to the post listed below:

  • 200 word minimum
  • Must reply to each post and must reply differently to each post!
  • Validates post with additional evidence from the literature.
  • Poses a thoughtful question which generates further discussion.
  • Provides an alternative point-of-view, and evidence is provided.
  • Offers additional insight into how the concept might be understood, with evidence provided.
  • NOTE: Respond as if you are writing a letter to them. (Do not just give general context)

POST:

1. P. Guest

 

For this week I chose to answer the first bullet (Listed Above) on being an intelligence analyst. I start with what resonated with me, the very first paragraph really hit home. It spoke about staying late, writing papers and creating products days to weeks at a time, and how the costumer may spend minutes looking over the information (Katz 2019).

Another aspect which was quite funny was the “30 minute walk” to the car–and, though it is not 30 minutes, my parking lot at work is quite a walk, and in the middle of the southern Nevada “desert” the heat is a blazing 115 during the summer. Now that I have shared the “funnies,” I will dive into some interesting topics and lessons learned.

One thing which truly resonated with me was mid page where it is speaking of policy makers and strategic intelligence analysts. The biggest different being outlined was intelligence analysts may be focusing on one aspect of a country (e.g., military) and the policy maker is focusing on the entire geopolitical and policy and military aspect of the country (Katz 2019).

As much as this may bear true to strategic analysts, at the tactical level of intelligence it is much more fast paced and focused on all issues which may impact the mission or operation which tends to be weighed upon the military, the state and non-state actors, the geopolitical and world events which may influence the populace, as well as the base of supporting the customer and crew flying and conducting the operation.

Though, for the most part, this highlighted how operating functions and support functions are simply that. Both parties know how to execute their objectives and know what information is needed to get the job done. Two different functions, yet they can both be mutually supportive of the other (and in fact drive one another).

Another topic mentioned was how the intelligence analyst is competing for the time to be concise and convey the value added of his or her intelligence (Katz 2019). This is very accurate when considering different parties who have, for the most part, surface level knowledge of what one another does, or can do/provide. I find this very applicable when intelligence is supporting operations at a tactical level.

Yes, the intel analysts will provide regular situation briefs, but the customer of that information is blind to how that information was obtained and how the technical means operate (though they truly do not need to know that aspect), and are unaware of what all can be provided stemming from lack of communication or even lack of expectation management.

Brian Katz (2019), CSIS, outlined eight steps for policy relevance: Take initiative; know the policy, know the process; be strategic, and be ready for tactical; provide opportunities, pull no punches; market your material; hit the road, hold your ground; get on the ground; and get in the saddle. Making all of this full circle, there are three lessons learned, two of which I have learned from this article stems from these eight steps.

The first of which is take initiative. This is a big lessons learned as working with different duty positions, the other non-intelligence-related officials are in such confusion when intelligence analyst start providing data without introducing who they are, where they come from, and by what means the information is being provided with the reliability of that data. It is one, a great way to start rapport by taking the next step into introducing who you are, but it also presents a point of contact for any information with need amplifying data later on. Secondly, is market your material.

This stems around data which is catered to the customer. Likewise for customers reading high-level intelligence papers and articles, it is written in way where the intended recipient knows exactly where to find the information they need in relations to brevity (i.e., where to skip all the fancy words). Many times in All-Source intelligence products, we are analyzing data from certain collections means which ramps up the classification, thus taking as simple as open source material, yet corroborated by higher-classified sources, and now the product is not intended for everyone.

Taking the time to market the products and ensure the customer is aware of the products which addresses a specific gap somewhere, it can be very useful. One last topic deals with reputation. It was mentioned how there are policymakers who will read regardless the intelligence produced, and those who will lose interest or just obtain a gist (Katz 2019).

I believe the was another similar, yet distinct, topic of interest. I believe it is important to constantly be evaluating the analyst (ourselves and others) as well as the effectiveness of the products which are being produced. In doing so, currency and relevance remain fluid. Overall, I believe this was a fantastic and easy read!

References:

Katz, Brain. 2019> “Policy and You: A Guide for Intelligence Analysts.” War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2019/02/policy-and-you-a-guide-for-intelligence-analysts/